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Can Cryptocurrencies Preserve
Privacy and Comply With
Regulations?
Geoff Goodell* and Tomaso Aste
Centre for Blockchain Technologies, University College London, London, United Kingdom
Cryptocurrencies offer an alternative to traditional methods of electronic value exchange,
promising anonymous, cash-like electronic transfers, but in practice they fall short
for several key reasons. We consider the false choice between total surveillance, as
represented by banking as currently implemented by institutions, and impenetrable
lawlessness, as represented by privacy-enhancing cryptocurrencies as currently
deployed. We identify a range of alternatives between those two extremes, and we
consider two potential compromise approaches that offer both the auditability required
for regulators and the anonymity required for users.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The surveillance economy has arrived (Zuboff, 2015). The popularity of online service platforms
has enabled service providers to collect, aggregate, and analyse data about the behavior of
individuals with a volume and scope never before possible. Data brokers have created amarketplace
for exchanging information about individuals that can be used to link their various online actions,
including but not limited to financial transactions. Such information, including the reuse of
credentials over successive transactions, can be used to link the transactions to the transacting
parties (Beckett, 2014; Rieke et al., 2016). Such a linkage can greatly simplify successive transactions,
reducing costs for the provider and improving customer experience. However, the potential for
monitoring profoundly influences the everyday behavior of individuals as they conduct their
various activities (Schep, 2017). The value of such control is reflected in an emerging marketplace
for record linkage via entity resolution, which seeks to determine the specific individual person
associated with any given activity and, correspondingly, the history of activities associated with any
given individual person (Bowes, 2018; Waldman et al., 2018).
In the context of longstanding arguments that privacy is a public good (Warren and Brandeis,
1890; Australian Law Reform Commission, 2014; Fairfield and Engel, 2015; Gaur and Mukherjee,
2017), it is worthwhile to consider whether such practices may serve to exacerbate social inequity
by restricting the ability to transact privately to those with sufficient wealth and power (Cole, 2014;
Hess, 2017). Financial transactions are no exception, since they reveal information about not only
the volume and recipients of individuals’ purchases and remittances but also their patterns, location
histories, social networks, and so on. Modern retail banking creates a kind of panopticon for
consumer behavior, ultimately promising to implement a mechanism that binds all of the financial
activities undertaken by an individual to a single, unitary identity. Consumers have legitimate
reasons to resist such surveillance, particularly in cases wherein monitoring is carried out without
their knowledge and judgments based upon such monitoring are used to disincentivize or punish
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legitimate activities. The risk to consumers increases with the
ever-increasing share of financial transactions that are performed
electronically. The increasing capability of third parties to
aggregate and analyse data about retail financial transactions
fundamentally changes the relationship between individuals and
their financial institutions.
Cryptocurrencies seem like a natural alternative for
exchanging value that can avoid the watchful eye of state
actors, powerful corporations, hackers, and others who might be
well-positioned to build a dossier of one’s activities. However, a
lack of appropriate regulation generally burdens cryptocurrency
users with practical limitations and risks. The risks include the
lack of financial products and services, the inability to earn
interest, basic consumer protection, and the absence of legal
infrastructure for adjudicating disputes. China has also restricted
the use of cryptocurrency exchanges as a means of addressing
capital outflows (Chen and Zhao, 2018).
Additionally, most cryptocurrencies are not as privacy-
enhancing as is commonly perceived, and as state actors attempt
to erect a cordon around criminal activity that relies upon
cryptocurrencies, some governments have actively sought to
undermine the adoption of cryptocurrencies that are most
respectful of an individual’s privacy. For example, the Financial
Services Agency in Japan pressured cryptocurrency exchanges
to drop privacy-enhancing tokens such as Monero Adelstein
(2018), one of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges in South
Korea subsequently delisted privacy-enhancing tokens (Dixit,
2018), the US Department of Homeland Security specifically
called for methods to circumvent privacy protections in
privacy-enhancing cryptocurrencies (United States Department
of Homeland Security, 2018), and the UK Financial Conduct
Authority offered guidance indicating its intention to “prevent
[rather than simply prosecute] the use of cryptoassets for
illicit activity” (Treasury, 2018). Furthermore, whether or not
these government initiatives succeed in preventing untraceable
cryptocurrencies from achieving mainstream adoption, even
the most private cryptocurrencies suffer from the arguably
intractable governance challenges associated with building a
decentralized network that respects the interests of its users.
Following the G20 summit held in Buenos Aires in 2018,
leaders resolved to “regulate crypto-assets for anti-money
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism in line with
FATF standards” (G20 Summit, 2018). Earlier, the UK Parliament
had published a report citing lack of consumer protection and
regulated marketplaces for crypto-assets as major drawbacks
associated with cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange,
also noting the possibility that anonymous transactions might
promote money laundering is a significant perceived risk, despite
that the UK National Crime Agency had assessed the risk as
low (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2018). So we have
reached an impasse, with institutions demanding control and
countenancing surveillance at one extreme, and cyberlibertarians
demanding privacy at the expense of regulation on the other.
Let us commence this article by introducing a set of
“desiderata”: properties that a payment system should have. They
are listed in Table 1. In addition to usefulness, security, and
privacy, we also note the various arguments for money as a “valid
TABLE 1 | Desiderata for an electronic payment method.
Robust to cyberattacks
Usable without registration
Unlinkable transactions
Electronic transactions
Suitable for taxation
Can block some illicit uses
Can be denominated in units of fiat currency
payment for all debts” (British Royal Mint, 2018), as a means of
funding government activity through taxation (Forstater, 2004).
We discuss how we can reframe our requirements such that
we might achieve a parsimonious set of regulatory objectives
while also respecting privacy and fulfilling the desiderata. We
follow and extend the ongoing discussion of how to regulate
cryptocurrency payments (Hughes and Middlebrook, 2015;
Tasca and Aste, 2018), with a view toward respecting human
rights (Goodell and Aste, 2018).
The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of the first
section, we discuss the regulatory context surrounding modern
retail financial transactions, and we introduce cryptocurrencies
as a prospective substitute for regulated payments. In the second
section, we compare and contrast three methods of conducting
financial transactions online: modern, regulated retail banking;
classic cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin; and privacy-enabling
cryptocurrencies such as Monero. In the third section, we
introduce two candidate approaches that each offer individuals
a verifiable means of transacting privately and also provide
suitable mechanisms by which institutions can enforce regulatory
compliance. In the final section we conclude with a discussion of
the opportunities and tradeoffs.
1.1. Institutional Posture
Banks and other financial intermediaries in many jurisdictions
around the world are subject to anti-money laundering (AML)
or “know your customer” (KYC) regulations that require them
to collect data on individual accountholders and others who
make use of their services (GOV.UK, 2014; Better Business
Finance, 2017). The penalties for non-compliance are potentially
severe. In recent years, banks have dedicated significant
resources to building andmaintaining compliance infrastructure,
evidenced by the thousands of employees that they have
hired to monitor “high-risk” transactions, as well as “tens of
thousands of costly customer calls every month to refresh KYC
documents” (Breslow et al., 2017).
An international organization named the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) was established by the G7 in 1989 as
a trans-national effort to monitor financial activities, with
the stated purpose of investigating and preventing money
laundering and terrorist financing (Financial Action Task Force,
2018). FATF provides one of the mechanisms by which
AML/KYC regulations in different jurisdictions are promulgated
and coordinated. FATF also publishes a blacklist of nations
who fail to enforce rules that facilitate the identification and
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investigation of individual accountholders, with the purpose of
coordinating sanctions that force blacklisted nations to conform
(Financial Action Task Force, 2013).
The financial regulations imposed by economically powerful
jurisdictions such as the United States and the European
Union share common features. In the US, AML regulations
provide for customer identification and monitoring, as well as
the reporting of suspicious activities (United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2017). In the EU, Directive (EU)
2018/843 (“5AMLD”) requires that every financial transaction
must be associated with an account, and that every account
must be associated with a strongly identified responsible
individual (European Parliament, 2018). The directive also
significantly reduces the maximum allowed value for prepaid
cards and stipulates that remote transactions above EUR 50
must be accompanied by customer identification (European
Parliament, 2018). Note that 5AMLD specifically includes
cryptocurrencies as subject to its prescribed regulations on
financial transfers.
Although the systematic collection of identifying information
for individual accountholders might facilitate important
investigations, it also provides a mechanism by which authorities
can browse comprehensive or near-comprehensive financial
information about individuals without their knowledge.
Authorities with those capabilities, and the businesses positioned
to aggregate and analyse data collected for compliance purposes,
may also be able to conduct statistical evaluations of individuals
based upon the information available to their financial
institutions. Once aggregated and linked to unitary identities,
the transaction data collected by financial institutions offer a
detailed look into the habits, patterns, travels, associations, and
financial health of individuals.
The risks associated with such surveillance of electronic
transactions were recognized 50 years ago by Paul Armer of
the RAND Corporation, who identified the risk in a 1968 US
Senate deposition (Armer, 1968) and later argued that “if you
wanted to build an unobtrusive system for surveillance, you
couldn’t do much better than an [electronic funds transfer
system]” (Armer, 1975). Indeed, payment networks routinely
share information about financial transactions with credit
bureaus such as Experian (Steele, 2018), who are in the business
of judging individuals by their behaviors and whose judgments
form the basis of decisions made by lenders, insurers, and
other clients of analytics companies (Christl, 2017). Additionally,
documents released by Edward Snowden have revealed that the
US National Security Agency has a division called “Follow the
Money” (FTM) that systematically collects and analyses data
from payment networks (Spiegel, 2013).
1.2. Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies have enjoyed popularity in recent years, and
people have flocked to cryptocurrencies for a variety of reasons.
The idea of accountless digital cash is hardly new, dating at
least as far back as the 1982 paper by David Chaum on blind
signatures (Chaum, 1983), the technology that he later used
to start DigiCash Inc., which folded in Pitta (1999). Other
attempts to develop accountless electronic payment systems
such as E-Gold (Meek, 2007) and Liberty Reserve (BBC,
2013) were designed with privacy in mind, and ultimately ran
afoul of authorities when criminals used those systems for
nefarious purposes.
By the time Bitcoin emerged in early 2009 (Nakamoto, 2009),
the financial crisis had prompted aggressive responses from
central banks around the world, and surely it was no coincidence
that the message of circumventing inflationary monetary policy
enjoyed appeal among would-be hoarders. However, given the
history of privacy as a primary motivation for the adoption
of digital cash, we surmise that many of the cryptocurrency
adopters (other than speculators) are primarily seeking privacy,
whether to circumvent capital controls or just to avoid the
“pastoral gaze” of state or corporate surveillance (Sotirakopoulos,
2017). Some important developments in recent years corroborate
this view, most notably the attempts to develop a “stablecoin”:
a cryptocurrency that avoids the volatility of cryptocurrency
prices by establishing a market peg, for example to a fiat
currency (Buterin, 2014). The most notorious example of a
stablecoin is Tether, a cryptocurrency that was established for
the purpose of maintaining a one-to-one peg with the US
Dollar (Popper, 2017; Williams-Grut, 2018). For this reason,
stablecoins can be denominated in units of fiat currency.
However, stablecoins have important limitations, including
well-justified concerns about unilateral exchange rate pegs in
general (Rogoff and Meltzer, 1998).
As a replacement for the “legitimate” currencies underwritten
by the full faith and credit of sovereign governments,
cryptocurrencies are far from perfect. There are structural
reasons for this, including:
1. Absence of financial services. There is a notable absence of
reliable organizations that offer routine financial services
such as lending, and more importantly, there is a lack
of regulatory support for crytpocurrencies. Further, in
contrast to transactions conducted via global messaging
systems such as SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication, 2018), there is generally no
way to correct or unwind erroneous transactions performed
with permissionless cryptocurrencies, a critical operational
limitation. For cryptocurrencies to be a true substitute for
government-issued currencies, they must support a range of
marketplaces and financial products.
2. Absence of regulated marketplaces. History tells us that
unregulated marketplaces for financial products can be
harmful to ordinary citizens and businesses alike; consider for
example the misbehavior of brokers and market participants
that led to the creation of the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (Durr and Kinnane, 2018). Cryptocurrency
markets lack such controls and mechanisms to ensure
accountability, and unchecked market manipulation is
commonplace (Tam, 2017; Williams-Grut, 2017).
3. Absence of legal context. There is no generally applicable
mechanism for adjudicating disputes arising from
transactions that are executed in cryptocurrency. When
automatically executable contracts such as those that
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underpinned the “Decentralized Autonomous Organization”
that roiled the Ethereum community in 2016 (Williams-
Grut, 2017) are exploited, there is little legal recourse for
hapless victims. Although “certain operational clauses in legal
contracts” may be automated to beneficial effect (ISDA, 2017),
it would seem that a maximalist conception of the principle
of “code is law” may not be workable without a suitable
legal framework.
Furthermore, cryptocurrencies often fail to deliver on their
key promises. For example, they are often not as private as
is commonly believed. Analysis of Bitcoin transactions can
deanonymize them, and researchers have shown that it is
eminently possible to identify meaningful patterns among the
transactions (Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Tasca et al., 2016). The
problem persists not only as a result of prevalent web trackers
and the reuse of pseudonyms linked to Bitcoin wallets (Goldfeder
et al., 2017) but also because inbound transactions to a Bitcoin
address can fundamentally be linked to outbound transactions
from that address (Al Jawaheri et al., 2018). Indeed, it has even
been argued that the explicit traceability of transactions on the
Bitcoin ledger, combined with a straightforward approach to
tagging suspect transactions (Anderson et al., 2018), make it
even less private than traditional mechanisms of payment. Even
cryptocurrencies such asMonero, which are designed for privacy,
have been shown to have important weaknesses (Kappos et al.,
2018; Möser et al., 2018). Another, perhaps equally important
deficiency of cryptocurrencies is that they are not as decentralized
as is commonly believed. Although decentralization is often
touted as the raison d’être of cryptocurrencies (Buterin, 2017),
in practice the governance, “mining,” and infrastructure services
associated with cryptocurrencies have remained stubbornly
centralized for a variety of reasons (Chepurnoy, 2017). The
problem of decentralization is intimately related to the more
elemental governance problem how to ensure that the system
serves the interest of its users. Without institutional support,
there is little to ensure that this remains the case.
The governance problem is of particular significance to
stablecoins. Importantly, if a stablecoin is not maintained and
controlled by a central bank, then its users would need to be
concerned about who is ultimately providing assurance that it
will retain its value.
2. ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS TODAY
As electronic funds transfer systems have proliferated in recent
decades, so has the expectation that people will make use
of those systems. If this trend were to continue, we would
anticipate that the fixed costs associated with infrastructure
to support cash transactions would become harder to justify,
and variable costs such as widespread deployment of ATM
machines would be reduced. Individuals and small businesses
have various options to conduct transactions electronically.
“Electronic” financial transactions include nearly all economic
transactions that are not conducted using cash, notwithstanding
the use of precious metals, money orders, and barter. For
our purposes, all payments involving institutional accounts,
including card payments (via payment networks), wire transfers,
ACH, and even physical cheques, are conducted electronically,
as are payments conducted using cryptocurrency. Next, we shall
consider the characteristics of transactions in three examples
of electronic payments: those involving institutional accounts,
those involving “basic” cryptocurrencies, and those involving
“privacy-enabling” cryptocurrencies.
2.1. Modern Retail Banking
Modern retail banking involves electronic transactions between
accounts, each of which represents a bilateral relationship
between a financial institution (e.g., a bank) and another entity,
perhaps an individual. Institutions are generally regulated by
governments. Individuals and businesses may agree to exchange
value (for example, in return for goods and services), but
in reality the transaction takes place between institutions,
which mutually agree to modify the state of the accounts
such that the account of the “receiver” is incremented and
the account of the “sender” is decremented correspondingly.
Record of the transactions and their results are generally visible
to the institutions, accountholders, authorities, and auditors.
Figure 1 offers an illustration of the data flows corresponding
to two transactions. Institutions are direct participants in the
transactions. Both the accounts and the transactions may be
monitored, i.e. “external” observers such as authorities (and
in some cases others, such as unprivileged employees of the
institutions and hackers) are able to examine the records of the
transactions, their results, and the transactions themselves. Since
the set of regulated institutions is small, it is efficient for an
observer to collect, aggregate, and analyse the data associated
with substantially all of the transactions that take place within
the system.
By contrast, data on transactions involving cash are relatively
difficult to observe in this fashion, and are therefore more
private. However, although cash remains a popular instrument
for retail transactions, its use is decreasing as consumers become
more comfortable with electronic means of payment (Matheny
et al., 2016). Some economists such as Kenneth Rogoff
hail this transformation as a welcome development, citing
reductions in tax evasion and crime as primary benefits as
anonymous payments are curtailed (Rogoff, 2017). Others
are more circumspect. Citing Sweden’s drive to become
cashless, Jonas Hedman recognized the loss of privacy as
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of modern retail banking transaction
flows. The buildings with columns represent financial institutions with which
the transacting parties hold accounts. Money is exchanged in state-issued
currency, as represented by the Pound Sterling symbols. Authorities and other
powerful actors can monitor both the institutions and the flows, as represented
by the magnifying glasses.
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the primary disadvantage of a cashless society, although
he also acknowledged that the transition to cashlessness
is inevitable (Knowledge@Wharton, 2018). Assuming
that the insistence on unitary identifiers for all electronic
financial transactions as proposed by regulations such as
5AMLD (European Parliament, 2018) is satisfied, and combined
with large-scale aggregation and analysis of the sort already in
practice (Spiegel, 2013), cashlessness means the creation of a
browseable “permanent record” for every individual containing
his or her entire transaction history.
2.2. “Basic” Cryptocurrency, e.g., Bitcoin
Cryptocurrencies offer an alternative payment mechanism that
avoids some aspects of the surveillance infrastructure that
characterizes institutionally-mediated retail bank transactions.
Modern cryptocurrencies generally take the form of bearer
instruments, in the sense that their units are each represented
by a public key on a public ledger and controlled by the
knowledge of the matching private key. Users are not required
to establish accounts or furnish identification information of
any sort to receive, possess, or spend cryptocurrency. This
is not to say that accounts do not exist; most users of
popular cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum establish
accounts with centralized wallet providers such as blockchain.info
ormyetherwallet (Chepurnoy, 2017). Providers of accounts could
be compromised or subverted by state actors or other powerful
groups with an interest in surveillance. Some account platforms
cooperate with national regulators (United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2018), and some national regulators
have declared that they will limit the scope of the rules that
would apply to such platforms (Higgins, 2016). Many if not
most cryptocurrency transactions are done by speculators, not
those who intend to use cryptocurrency for its fundamental
properties (Russo, 2018), so even if most traders in practice
might be indifferent to strong identity requirements crafted by
regulators to satisfy AML goals, such rules undermine a key
design objective of cryptocurrencies themselves.
In principle, however, users of cryptocurrencies are not
required to register with platforms, and they may possess
cryptocurrency tokens on their own devices. Figure 2 shows how
this works in practice. Assuming that cryptocurrency users take
precautions not to reveal their identities whilst transacting, for
example by using anonymity systems such as Dingledine et al.
(2004), they might expect to avoid identity-based blacklisting
when they receive tokens. However, depending upon the system
FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation of bitcoin transaction flows. Transacting
parties can store value on their own devices, represented as piggy banks. The
flows can be monitored by anyone.
design, adversaries may still be able to monitor the flows.
Because successive Bitcoin transactions are linkable to each other,
those able to monitor the network can determine successive
transactions associated with specific tokens and ultimately
deanonymize Bitcoin users (Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Tasca et al.,
2016; Al Jawaheri et al., 2018).
The fact that individual tokens can be traced means that
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin may not be entirely fungible,
in the sense of being “easy to exchange or trade for something
else of the same type and value” (Cambridge English Dictionary,
2017), as an individual might be less willing to accept certain
specific cryptocurrency tokens because doing so might implicitly
link that individual to previous owners of the tokens. Traceability
has created demand for newly-minted or “clean” tokens that
are harder to link to the previous owners or (ultimately)
the previous transactions of the current owner (Osborne,
2016), and the proposed blacklists of cryptocurrency addresses
associated with suspicious operators could further exacerbate this
distinction (Hinkes and Ciccolo, 2018). To avoid this problem,
a cryptocurrency implementation would need to offer assurance
that a transaction by an asset holder would generally not,
directly or indirectly, result in that asset holder being linked to
other transactions that had taken place previously. Additionally,
cryptocurrencies that make use of immutable ledgers and do not
protect against traceability may for that reason be non-compliant
with data protection regulations such as GDPR that specify a
“right to be forgotten” (Maxwell and Salmon, 2017).
2.3. “Privacy-Enabling” Cryptocurrency,
e.g., Monero
Some cryptocurrencies, most notably Zcash and Monero, are
explicitly designed to address traceability concerns (Sedgwick,
2018). Monero in particular takes an approach that incorporates
several security mechanisms, including:
1. Ring Signatures, which allow signed messages to be
attributable to “a set of possible signers without
revealing which member actually produced the
signature” (Rivest et al., 2001).
2. Stealth Addresses,which refer to methods for key management
in which public keys are derived separately from private keys
for the purpose of obscuring the public keys (Courtois and
Mercer, 2017), and
FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of monero transaction flows. In an
“idealized” version of Monero or other privacy-enabling cryptocurrency,
observers would not be able to infer information about transacting parties or
the relationships between transactions by monitoring the ledger or the
transactions themselves, as indicated by the magnifying glasses with the
negation symbol. The piggy banks indicate that users are storing the tokens
privately rather than relying upon accounts.
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3. Confidential Transactions, which use Pedersen commitment
schemes Pedersen (1991) to restrict disclosing the amounts
transacted to anyone other than the transacting parties (van
Wirdum, 2016).
Figure 3 illustrates how, in a successfully implemented privacy-
enabling cryptocurrency, metadata associated with transactions
would be hidden such that the data flows or the ledger would
not reveal relationships among transactions or any information
about the transacting parties. That said, the Monero design
and implementation still do not completely realize this goal;
its process for mixing transactions suffers from inconsistent
selection probability among all elements of the anonymity
set (Möser et al., 2018). Monero spokesperson Riccardo Spagni
countered that “privacy isn’t a thing you achieve, it’s a constant
cat-and-mouse battle” (Greenberg, 2018), echoing longstanding
arguments by others that privacy is inevitably an endeavor of
vigilance and responsiveness (Zimmermann, 1991).
Some authorities such as the Japanese Financial Security
Agency (FSA) (Viglione, 2018; Wilmoth, 2018) and the United
States Secret Service (Novy, 2018) have responded to so-
called “privacy coins” by banning the use of privacy-enhancing
cryptocurrencies whilst accepting other cryptocurrencies as
legitimate by comparison. For a cryptocurrency exchange or
other provider of cryptocurrency-based financial services to be
compliant under such rules, it would need to restrict its activities
to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum which do
not have the privacy characteristics that have been sought by
cryptocurrency advocates for decades.
There have also been some attempts, notably
Mimblewimble (Jedusor, 2016), to retrofit basic cryptocurrencies
with some of the characteristics of privacy-enabling
cryptocurrencies, although it remains to be seen whether
such approaches will turn out to be more effective than
cryptocurrencies designed with better intrinsic privacy features
in the first instance.
3. PROPOSED HYBRID APPROACHES
We consider the following challenge facing policymakers,
regulators, and technologists alike: how can we achieve realism
the benefits of government regulation without creating a central
database that irreversibly connects all persons with all of their
transactions? There are two parts to this question. The first
part is primarily about technology: can we build a system that
securely processes financial transactions conducted electronically
without revealing data about the transacting parties? The answer
is yes, as described in our discussion of privacy-enabling
cryptocurrency, with an important qualification that privacy is
really an iterative process that can only really be developed
through active commitment and ongoing vigilance. The second
part is primarily about government policy:
• What exactly are the key government objectives for
regulating transactions?
• Which objectives are essential, and which can be deprioritized?
• Do any of the objectives conflict with the human right
to privacy?
Table 2 shows how the existing payment methods achieve
the desiderata listed in section 1. (None of the popular
cryptocurrencies are known to offer totally unlinkable
transactions, continual improvements notwithstanding). Can
we achieve a compromise that does better than the prevailing
methods for electronic payments?
In this section we introduce two approaches to frame the
discussion of how to resolve the tension. The first approach,
institutionally supported privacy-enabling cryptocurrency,
provides regulated institutions with tools and procedures for
interacting with privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies, creating a
structure for legal interpretations of their use. We assume that
the distributed ledgers underlying such cryptocurrencies are
not controlled by regulated financial institutions. The second
approach, institutionally mediated private value exchange,
establishes a method by which regulated institutions can conduct
financial transactions on a distributed ledger that shares essential
characteristics with privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies. In this
case, we assume that the distributed ledgers used for this
purpose are controlled by regulated financial institutions. The
main difference between the two approaches is that the first
approach allows businesses to transact with cryptocurrencies
that are managed and governed outside the mainstream financial
system, and the second approach provides a way for regulated
financial institutions to offer a mechanism for their clients to
exchange money that resembles cryptocurrency in that clients
can withdraw money electronically and subsequently use it
without reference to an account, as they would with cash.
There is a third possibility, which we might describe
as “institutionally supported privacy-enabling stablecoins,” in
which the privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies in question are
actually stablecoins. This possibility is theoretically worth
pursuing if stablecoins achieve popularity commensurate with
cryptocurrencies, although the experience of Tether suggests it
might not be easy. It is worth considering that the proposal for
TABLE 2 | Comparison of various existing electronic payment methods.
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institutionally mediated private value exchange is similar to a
stablecoin in that the tokens represent units of fiat currency.
However, because the regulated financial institutions are assumed
to be part of the banking system they would not need to bear the
risk associated with maintaining a market peg.
3.1. Institutionally Supported
Privacy-Enabling Cryptocurrency
Our first approach starts with existing, privacy-enabling
cryptocurrencies such as Zcash or Monero and assumes that
regulators have chosen to embrace the new methods for
exchanging value and accept, if not support outright, at least
some of the various communities that have formed around
particular cryptocurrencies to provide governance and software
development. Acceptance of cryptocurrencies by governments
and other institutions is certainly plausible; for instance, the Bank
of England concluded that cryptocurrencies “currently do not
pose a material risk to UK financial stability” (Bank of England,
2018). It assumes that government priorities include collecting
taxes and monitoring transactions undertaken by businesses and
regulated institutions.
Figure 4 illustrates how institutions would join existing
cryptocurrency systems as full participants. The motivation
for broker-dealers and other institutions to participate is well-
established; financial services related to cryptocurrencies are
in demand by hedge funds and other clients (Hankin, 2018;
Verhage et al., 2018). Of course, this implies that broker-dealers
would likely undertake activities related to unregulated markets
and marketplaces (i.e., the cryptocurrencies themselves), and
presumably the governance of the cryptocurrencies would not
be under institutional control. That said, the distributed ledger
underlying the cryptocurrencies would ensure that there would
be an audit trail of all transactions, even if the details of those
transactions might be inscrutable to authorities, auditors, or
others without the active participation of the transacting parties.
To facilitate monitoring, auditing, and taxation, we assume
that regulators would stipulate that all cryptocurrency
transactions undertaken by certain legal entities other than
individual persons, such as registered corporations, licensed
businesses, charities, trusts, and some partnerships, must take
place via regulated institutional intermediaries such as banks,
custodians, or broker-dealers. In general, such legal entities are
already subject to various forms of government oversight, for
example tax reporting requirements, so to introduce additional
requirements and enforceability for cryptocurrency transactions
is not unfathomable. The institutions would carry out AML/KYC
compliance procedures as they currently do, and regulators
would require that all cryptocurrency disbursements from such
registered corporations or organizations, including dividends,
interest, proceeds from disposal of cryptocurrency-denominated
assets, and payments, including without limitation payments to
suppliers, service providers, employees, and contractors, would
take the form of remittances to other institutional accounts that
hold cryptocurrency.
Individuals and non-business partnerships would not be
subject to the same requirements and would be permitted
FIGURE 4 | Schematic representation of institutionally supported
privacy-enabling cryptocurrency: nodes. Institutions would join global
networks of servers operating as nodes in existing cryptocurrency networks;
not all participants in these networks are regulated institutions.
to transact and hold cryptocurrency privately, as they do in
many countries today. Figure 5 shows how this would work in
practice. Businesses would maintain accounts with institutions
and could direct the institutions to remit payments to other
institutionally held accounts, including those whose beneficial
owners are individuals, and individuals could in turn direct
their institutional accounts to remit payments to their private
cryptocurrency storage, which might or might not be hosted
by a wallet provider. Individuals could then remit payments
from their own private storage to regulated businesses, such as
merchants, private organizations, or service providers, without
necessarily revealing their identities or a link to previous
transactions such as those from which they received the
cryptocurrency in the first place; Figure 6 offers an illustration.
Given that the legal entities covered in the last paragraph are
typically subject to financial reporting requirements, for example
to quantify reimbursements or to reconcile changes in assets with
income, we assert that it would be no easier for a business to
deputize an individual to conduct cryptocurrency transactions on
its behalf than it would for a business to deputize an individual to
conduct any other financially meaningful aspect of its business.
Dividing the different ways of holding the cryptocurrency
into two categories based upon whether or not it is held
via accounts associated with regulated institutions may be
considered analogous to dividing Zcash into “T” (Transparent)
and “Z” (Shielded) addresses (Peterson, 2016).
Because all cryptocurrency accounts held by corporations
and registered businesses would be subject to monitoring by
regulated institutions, the infrastructure would ensure that the
taxable income of such corporations and businesses would be
known. Because all payments from corporations and registered
businesses must be remitted to other institutional accounts,
the infrastructure would ensure that the income of their
shareholders, suppliers, service providers, and employees would
be known and attributable to the correct legal entities. Authorities
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FIGURE 5 | Schematic representation of institutionally supported
privacy-enabling cryptocurrency: transaction flows (1). (We use the Monero
symbol to represent any privacy-enabling cryptocurrency without loss of
generality). Corporations and registered businesses with accounts held by
regulated financial institutions (leftmost icon) that would be subject to
monitoring and may only remit cryptocurrency payments to other accounts
held by regulated financial institutions. Individuals and non-business
partnerships (center icon) may transfer cryptocurrency from accounts to
unmonitored, private storage (rightmost icon).
FIGURE 6 | Schematic representation of institutionally supported
privacy-enabling cryptocurrency: transaction flows (2). An individual (shown at
left) with a private store of cryptocurrency could remit payments without
revealing her identity to a business with accounts held by a regulated
institution (shown at right).
would realize other benefits as well. The distributed ledger
maintained by the cryptocurrency node operators would be
observable by regulators and other authorities and cross-
referenced against any cash flow statements of businesses
engaged in cryptocurrency transactions. Private transactions
suspected of criminal activity could be verified by investigators
with the cooperation of one of the counterparties, even if the
investigation might not necessarily reveal identifying details of
the other counterparty.
One type of transaction under this system that might be
of particular concern to authorities is illustrated by Figure 7,
in which an individual with a private cryptocurrency store
remits cryptocurrency to another individual with a private
cryptocurrency store, not involving a regulated institution.
The fact that such transactions could take place without
the involvement of institutions means that authorities
would be unable to completely enforce restrictions on
who is able to transact, in accordance with the FATF
recommendations (Financial Action Task Force, 2018). We
could argue that value will find its way to criminal organizations
with or without the sanctions advised by FATF (Competitive
Enterprise Institute, 2000), or that those willing to break the
FIGURE 7 | Schematic representation of institutionally supported
privacy-enabling cryptocurrency: transaction flows (3). Individuals with private
stores of privacy-enabling cryptocurrency may transact directly without
revealing their identities.
law have many options to anonymously acquire “legitimate”
accounts (Hern, 2015), or that prospective money launderers
with sufficient assets will find other ways to transact outside
the system. Whether or not such arguments are sound,
cryptocurrencies might become a dominant form of exchanging
value precisely because people value privacy, in which case
regulators will need to support cryptocurrency transactions
simply because those are the transactions that are taking place.
After all, people certainly exchanged value before central banks
started issuing currency.
Another, equally important, characteristic of this approach
is that without institutional mediation at their core,
cryptocurrencies are subject to the vicissitudes of mining
pools, hackers, and powerful global-scale actors who might
compromise or hijack them, as well as speculators and market
manipulators who might simply deplete their value. However,
an alternative interpretation of that property is that different
cryptocurrencies would compete with each other, not only on
the basis of market penetration but also on the basis of privacy.
It is difficult to imagine a currency in a monopoly position,
state-sponsored or otherwise, having this characteristic.
3.2. Institutionally Mediated Private Value
Exchange
Our second approach starts with the assumption that the “public”
cryptocurrencies are not suitable for all kinds of institutional
support, perhaps for the reasons cited in section 3.1. Instead,
it proposes to establish a distributed ledger for conducting
financial transactions, and that each node of the distributed
ledger would be owned and operated by a regulated institution, as
shown in Figure 8. This could be achieved with a “permissioned”
distributed ledger system such as Hyperledger (2018), using
an energy-efficient Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus algorithm
such as PBFT (Castro and Liskov, 1999). Users and governments
would benefit from the fact that transacting parties would
not need to use cryptocurrency of dubious value but in fact
could transact using digital versions of state-issued currency,
i.e., central bank digital currency (CBDC), which is currently
under consideration by central banks around the world and may
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FIGURE 8 | Schematic representation of institutionally mediated private value
exchange: nodes. The distributed ledger is operated by a federation of
regulated institutions.
offer a variety of economic and operational benefits (Bank for
International Settlements, 2018).
At this point it might be tempting to suggest that since
the entire network consists of regulated or otherwise approved
financial institutions, then governments should require the
establishment of a “master key” or other exceptional access
mechanism, so that they might be able to break the anonymity
of users. We argue that this temptation should be resisted.
Over the years, policymakers have called for broadly applied
exceptional access mechanisms in a variety of contexts, and after
considerable debate, such calls have been found to be premature
and subsequently withdrawn (Abelson et al., 1997, 2015; Benaloh,
2018). Indeed, legislators in the United States (Congress of
the United States, 2018) and France (Thomson, 2016) have
gathered opposition to exceptional access mechanisms, citing
their intrinsic security weaknesses and potential for abuse.
Indeed, for the approach we present to be a private
value exchange, the regulated institutions must commit to
facilitating private transactions. At one level, the institutions
must adopt the specific technologies such as ring signatures,
stealth addresses, and confidential transactions used by privacy-
enabling cryptocurrencies such as Monero. At another level, the
institutions must commit to an ongoing effort to audit, challenge,
and improve the technology and operational procedures, because
privacy-enhancing technologies require vigilance (Zimmermann,
1991). It follows that the institutions and the authorities of the
jurisdictions in which they operate must commit to ensuring
that the technology and operational procedures are effective in
safeguarding the privacy of transacting parties against politically,
financially, and technologically powerful groups who might have
contrary interests.
It is assumed that authorities would take the same measures
described in section 3.1 to ensure that corporations and
registered businesses use known, monitorable accounts for all
of their transactions. Enforcement of such a policy would be
qualitatively easier in this case since the entire network is owned
and operated by regulated institutions, and regulators could
expect the same benefits associated with monitoring taxable
income and reconciling line items in cash flow statements against
actual, auditable transfers on the distributed ledger.
State actors would realize another important benefit from
this approach as well. Because all transactions must necessarily
involve a regulated institution, transactions of the sort described
in Figure 7, in which private actors exchange value directly
via their own private stores, would not be possible. Figure 9
illustrates how a user would make payments privately. A user
would initially receive funds into her account with a registered
institution, which she would in turn remit to her private store.
When she wants to make a payment to a merchant or service
provider, she can remit the funds to the account that organization
holds with a registered institution. The privacy features of the
distributed ledger, such as ring signatures, stealth addresses,
transaction confidentiality, and any other necessary features that
may be developed from time to time, would ensure that when
the individual makes the payment, she does not reveal either
her identity or any information about her prior transactions,
including the transactions from which she originally received
the funds.
By ensuring that no single enterprise receives too large
a share of any individual’s transactions in the system, the
use of a distributed ledger achieves an essential requirement
of the design. Individuals would be expected to use their
private stores to transact with many different counterparties, via
their own regulated intermediaries, so no single intermediary
would have a global, “panopticon-like” view of all of the
individual’s transactions.
Since individuals cannot transact directly via their private
stores, to exchange value they must transact via a regulated
intermediary as shown in Figure 10. Individuals conducting
transactions might not need to have accounts to exchange value
with each other; we surmise that the regulated intermediary
would perform the service for a fee. We also suggest
that the intermediary would not be required to carry out
strong identification of the sort required by the FATF
recommendations (Financial Action Task Force, 2018) but
might require a less-stringent form of identification, such as
an attribute-backed credential indicating that either the sender
or the receiver are eligible to transact (Camenisch et al.,
2013). Regulated intermediaries could also provide token mixing
services for groups of individuals who satisfy AML criteria,
without explicitly requiring knowledge of their unitary identities.
If successfully operationalized, the approach described in
this section would offer governments the same benefits to
taxation and auditing as the approach described in section 3.1,
and governments would additionally gain the ability to
impose blacklists or economic sanctions on targeted recipients.
Individuals would receive the same privacy benefits described
in section 3.1 for transactions involving merchants and service
providers, and identification requirements of intermediaries for
other transactions could be made parsimonious. However, there
are two main drawbacks for individuals seeking privacy, the first
being that individuals would need to interact with a registered
intermediary before they are able to make or receive payments.
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FIGURE 9 | Schematic representation of institutionally mediated private value exchange: private transactions. As in Figure 5, an individual receives funds into her
institutional account (second icon from left) and transfers them to her private store (second icon from right). Unlike in Figure 5, the funds may be state-issued
currency, as indicated by the Pound Sterling symbols, rather than cryptocurrency. When she wants to make a payment, she must remit it from her private store to an
account held by a regulated institution (rightmost icon).
FIGURE 10 | Schematic representation of institutionally mediated private value
exchange: mediated transactions between consumers. Individuals (outer
icons) wishing to transact with each other via their private stores rather than
accounts with regulated institutions must transact via a regulated intermediary
(center icon).
The other, more serious concern is the question of themechanism
by which the privacy-enabling properties of the system is
assured. Inasmuch as cryptocurrencies represent a check on state
power (Sotirakopoulos, 2017), we have reason to believe that
the privacy characteristics of cryptocurrencies will continue to
improve, despite their demonstrable shortcomings (Kappos et al.,
2018; Möser et al., 2018).
If the regulated institutions that design, deploy, and maintain
the infrastructure for executing transactions are asked to carry
the flag for the privacy of their clients, then there could be
a misalignment of interests. Clients would need to know the
actual privacy limitations of the infrastructure, so adversarial
audits would need to be carried out from time to time in the
interest of the public. Then, institutions would need incentives
and resources to continuously improve the infrastructure and fix
any deficiencies on an ongoing basis. A process for admitting
new participants would be necessary to ensure that the network
remains distributed, and it would need to satisfy an openness
criterion to ensure that privacy-threatening procedures do not
develop outside the view of the public eye. There would also
need to be a diversity of implementations, such that sporadic
vulnerabilities do not threaten the privacy of a significant share
of the users of the system.
Arguably, such incentives exist among cryptocurrencies,
since they must compete for business. It remains to be seen
whether effective auditing and competition could assure the
privacy-enabling properties of a value exchange operated entirely
by institutions.
TABLE 3 | Comparison of various electronic payment methods, including the new
proposed methods.
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Robust to cyberattacks  # # # # # #
Usable without registration  #     #
Unlinkable* transactions H# # # #    
Electronic transactions #       
Suitable for taxation H#  # H# #   
Can block some illicit uses #  # # # #  
Can be denominated in   #  # #  
units of fiat currency
*Potentially.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Framing the ongoing conversation about the future of payments
as a set of tradeoffs, we introduced two possible candidate
architectures for a privacy-enabling electronic value exchange:
institutionally supported privacy-enabling cryptocurrency
and institutionally mediated private value exchange. Both
architectures require both the design, implementation,
deployment, and maintenance of new technology as well as
the development of regulatory policy in which such technology
will operate. Table 3 summarizes the tradeoffs and contextualizes
our two prospective approaches. Cash has many desirable
properties, such as universality (i.e., its use does not require a
relationship with a registered institution) and privacy in practice
(serial numbers on banknotes can be traced but generally are
not). However, it cannot be sent across computer networks and is
sometimes used for illicit transactions, including tax evasion. In
contrast, modern retail banking requires accounts and facilitates
large-scale surveillance. The most popular cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin do not actually avoid surveillance and are
in some ways potentially easier to trace than ordinary retail
transactions. Privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies promise to
address both deficiencies, although research has shown that
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the goals motivating their development have not yet been
fully achieved.
The various approaches to electronic payments each have their
own advantages and limitations, and by elaborating the tradeoffs,
we hope to facilitate a more fulsome conversation among the
stakeholders and offer a useful framework for discussing future
solutions. We believe that both approaches have their place
and prospective adherents, and the adoption of one would not
exclude the adoption of the other. Businesses that offer services
to cryptocurrency users and traders would find value in the
first approach, and businesses seeking to facilitate private, cash-
like electronic transactions within a regulated system would find
value in the second approach. Correspondingly, some regulators
might be troubled by supporting trade in assets whose value
and uses are beyond their reach, as would be the case in the
first approach, and some privacy-minded individuals might be
troubled by the possibility that the regulated financial institutions
that operate the system described in the second approach might
secretly collude to compromise the anonymity of their clients.
We suggest that institutionally supported privacy-enabling
cryptocurrency would be strictly better than privacy-enabling
cryptocurrency without institutional support, mainly because
regulators would benefit from the ability to monitor corporations
and registered businesses that use cryptocurrencies. We also
suggest that institutionally mediated private value exchange
would be strictly better than modern retail banking as currently
practiced, mainly because users would avoid payment networks
and enjoy an improved expectation of privacy in their ordinary
activities. However, neither approach achieves all of the objectives
of both parties. For example, the ability to transact without
interacting with a regulated institution may be incompatible
with the ability for a government to block illicit use. Similarly,
monetary policy might not be possible if cryptocurrency
governance were exogenous to the state, although the possibility
of this happening at scale seems remote. As the hard choices
for the future of payments come to light, we believe that
acknowledgment and discussion of these tradeoffs, as well as a
commitment to both serious privacy and serious regulation, are
prerequisites for advancing the interests of all stakeholders.
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